China's infrastructure-building binge in South China Sea

Note: This photo-essay appeared in a slightly different version under the title 'Infrastructure-building binge in South China Sea' in the 24-30 Apr 2015 issue of the FilAm Star, the weekly 'newspaper for Filipinos in mainstream America,' published in San Francisco, CA. This author/blogger is the Manila-based Special News/Photo Correspondent of the paper.

Reefs in the Spratlys that China has occupied.  Infographics by the AFP Public Affairs Office.

“We call on China to stop the reclamation activities and to be mindful of its responsibilities as a claimant state and an important member of the international community,” Armed Forces of the Philippines Chief of Staff Gen. Gregorio Pio Catapang, Jr. expressed during the press conference held on 20 April before the start of Balikatan 2015, the US-Philippines military exercises.

Catapang showed the latest images of the massive reclamation activities by China in the disputed islands in the West Philippine Sea: Mabini (Johnson in the US Board of Geographic Names) Reef, Chigua (Kennan) Reef, Calderon (Cuarteron) Reef, Kagitingan (Fiery Cross) Reef, Burgos (Gaven) Reef,  Panganiban (Mischief) Reef and Zamora (Subi) Reef.  All of these reefs are claimed by the Philippines, and Panganiban Reef is within the country’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

Image of Mischief [Panganiban] Reef as of 17 Mar 2015 shows artificial land

formation, dredgers and construction equipment, among others. 

Photo Credit: CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative /DigitalGlobe.

Panganiban Reef is claimed by the Philippines, Vietnam, China and Taiwan. “When it was first occupied by China,” according to the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI), “it was completely submerged at high tide. Therefore, it likely does not qualify as an island under Article 121 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).”

The Philippines had vigorously protested China’s construction of structures there since 1995. The “octagonal wooden makeshifts” of 1995 upgraded to “a single, permanent, multi-story building in 1998, and to a “three-storey concrete building” in 2014, AMTI reported.

It is possible that Panganiban Reef has been transformed into a naval base capable of accommodating one People’s Liberation (PLA) Army Navy at a time. “In 2014, Philippine fishermen began to report increased patrols by the PLA Navy and the Chinese Coast Guard, impinging on their ability to fish in the area,” AMTI said.

AMTI noted that images taken from January to March 2015 showed that dredging, reclamation and construction activities have been going on in Panganiban Reef:  “ The southern platform has been further expanded using sand recovered from the reef’s southern entrance. The entrance itself has been expanded to a width of approximately 275 meters [as of 16 March 2015].”

Progress of China’s airstrip construction on Fiery Cross [Kagitingan] Reef as of 

02 Apr 2015.  Photo Credit: CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative /DigitalGlobe.

Except for two rocks, according to the island tracker of AMTI, Kagitingan Reef (Fiery Cross) is submerged at high tide. That has entirely changed after China started reclamation activities in August 2014 although it had been there since 1987 when it agreed to build weather monitoring stations for a UNESCO project.

“Between August and November [2014],”AMTI reported, “Chinese dredgers created a land mass that spans the entire existing reef and is approximately 3,000 meters long and 200-300 meters wide. ... Fiery Cross may now be more than three times larger than the Taiwan-held Itu Aba, formerly the largest of the Spratly Islands.”

China’s construction works on Calderon [Cuarteron] Reef as of 18 Feb 2015.  

Photo Credit: AFP Public Affairs Office.                

Kagitingan Reef has turned into an artificial island. AMTI noted that “China has already constructed in excess of 60 permanent or semi-permanent rectangular buildings along on the northern side [and] at least 20 structures are visible on the southern side of the island.”

China is also building a 3,100 meter airstrip there. According to AMTI, this length of runway “can accommodate almost any type of aircraft [like transport, fighters, early warning and UAVs] that China could want to land [there],”and furthermore, it is also “installing port facilities, which may be capable of docking military tankers.”

China’s construction works on Chigua [Kennan] Reef as of 19 Feb 2015. 

Photo Credit: AFP Public Affairs Office.

A naval base on Panganiban and an airstrip on Kagitingan certainly lend military advantages to China. These could be bullying rams for them press their territorial claims.

In the keynote speech of Ambassador Cui Tiankai at the International Conference on China-US Cooperation in Global Security Affairs in Washington DC on 16 April 2015, he had these to say about their “maintenance and construction work” in the disputed areas:

“... Let me reiterate here that such work is well within China’s sovereignty. It does not impact or target any other country. The main purpose is to improve the functions of facilities there so as to provide services to ships of China, neighboring countries and other countries that sail across the South China Sea. Such services will include shelter for ships, navigation aid, search and rescue, marine meteorological observation, fishery service and many others. Emphasis will also be put on marine environment protection.

China’s construction works of Gaven [Burgos] Reef as of 29 Jan 2015. 

Photo Credit: AFP Public Affairs Office.

“Of course there will be defense facilities. This is only natural and necessary and they are purely for defensive purposes. If these facilities could not even defend themselves, how can they render service to others? If China could not safeguard its own sovereignty, how can it shoulder greater responsibilities for international stability? Therefore, building-up of China’s capabilities in the South China Sea provides public goods to all and serves the interests of maintaining security, stability and freedom of navigation there.”

The anxiety over these Chinese activities is expressed by Catapang: “We also believe that China’s massive reclamation activities will cause tensions among claimant countries not only because it could deter freedom of navigation but also due to its possible military purposes.”

China’s reclamation activities on Kagitingan [Fiery Cross] Reef as of 28 Jan 2015. 

Photo credit: AFP Public Affairs Office.

China has dispatched fleets of fishermen, possibly militia types, to their occupied reefs. It has also driven away not only Filipino fishermen but also those from the other claimant countries.

 “We are saddened hearing the reports that China has driven away Filipino fishermen near these reclamation sites and also in Bajo de Masinloc, denying our people of their own fishing areas which are the sources of their livelihood,” Catapang said.

The environmental toll of China’s reclamations:  “destruction of 300 acres of coral reef systems [that] is estimated to lead to economic losses to coastal states valued at US$100 million annually”, Catapang emphasized. “It is worth remembering that China has tolerated environmentally harmful fishing practices by its fishermen who are now occupying Bajo De Masinloc, a Philippine territory that was grabbed and now being dominated. These bad fishing practices are violations under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the Convention on Biological Diversity, and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES).”

China’s construction works on Mabini [Johnson] Reef as of 30 Jan 2015. 

Photo Credit: AFP Public Affairs Office.

Every Filipino should “support the government’s move to protest the ongoing construction works which clearly violated ASEAN-China Declaration of Conduct in which the signatories agreed to resolve the territorial dispute peacefully and exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes,” in the words of Gen. Catapang.

Out there at the West Philippine Sea is the rusting BRP-57 Sierra Madre, which ran aground near the Ayungin Shoal in 1999. It is our unlikely defender of a small piece of our territory despite the taunts of the Chinese Coast Guards.

China’s reclamation activities on Zamora [Subi] Reef as of 30 Jan 2015. 

Photo Credit: AFP Public Affairs Office.

It looks like that’s the best we can do at the moment while we wait for the decision of the Arbitration Tribunal. Hopefully, that will be our slingshot to stop the Chinese Goliath in its occupation of all the disputed rocks, reefs and islands in the South China Sea.

Understanding the turmoil at the West Philippine Sea

Note:  This photo-essay appeared in a slightly different version in the 17-23 April 2015 issue of FilAm Star, 'the newspaper for Filipinos in mainstream America' published in San Francisco, CA.  This author/blogger is the Manila-based Special News/Photo Correspondent of the weekly paper.

1785 map titled “Isole Filippine” from the 

Lopez Museum & Library collection.

We children of coastal towns on the western side of Luzon have fond remembrance of China Sea where we went swimming on hot summer days especially during the Easter weekends, and where we watch fishermen coming in from a night out at sea with either happy dispositions (big catch) or forlorn faces (empty nets).

We never called the blue waters South China Sea (SCS), supposedly its correct name.  But these past three years, we’ve been releasing marine turtle hatchlings to the West Philippine Sea (WPS), the now politically correct term.

The territorial and marine disputes at the SCS and WPS have been top news items in recent years. Greatly disturbing of late are reports about China’s reclamation activities there accompanied by photographic evidences of dredging and construction on rocks, reefs and islands in the Spratlys.

For better understanding of the issues, we’ve gone back to the basics. We started with “The West Philippine Sea -The Territorial and Maritime Jurisdiction Disputes from a Filipino Perspective - A Primer” (2013) of the Asian Center and the Institute of Maritime Affairs and Law of the Sea of the University of the Philippines. This is available in the internet for downloading. 

The Primer defines the parameters of the SCS and the WPS.  The SCS is “the much broader expanse of water ...a semi-enclosed sea, bounded by China/Taiwan in the north, by the Philippines in the east, and by Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and Brunei in the west and south.” Of particular interest are “various geographic features [scattered over the South China Sea], the most prominent of which are known internationally as the Spratlys, the Paracels, Macclesfield Bank and Pratas Island” because “[t]here are overlapping claims by various countries to these features and to the waters and resources surrounding them, including parts of the West Philippine Sea.”

  

Detail of a 1734 Murillo map showing Panacot (Scarborough Shoal).
From the Biblioteca Nacional de Espana online digital library.

On the other hand, “the West Philippine Sea refers to the part of the South China Sea that is closest, and of vital interest, to the Philippines.”  The naming took place almost three years ago, on 05 September 2012, when President Benigno Simeon C.Aquino III issued Administrative Order No. 29. This was given to “[t]he maritime areas on the western side of the Philippine archipelago which include the Luzon Sea as well as the waters around, within and adjacent to the Kalayaan Island Group and Bajo De Masinloc, also known as Scarborough Shoal.”  The AO says that this naming “is without prejudice to the determination of the maritime domain over territories which the Republic of the Philippines has sovereignty and jurisdiction.”

The Spratlys and the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) may have caused some confusion to many.  The Primer gives us this clear delineation:  “The {KIG} is a group of over fifty features and their surrounding waters that belong to the Philippines, located in what is internationally known as the Spratly Islands. The KIG is not the same as the Spratlys, however, as there are features in the Spratlys that are not part of the KIG.”

Detail of another 1734 Murillo map showing Panacot (Scarborough Shoal).
From the Lopez Museum & Library collection.

The Philippine flag flies over the KIG. “The islands, reefs and rocks of the KIG are nearest the Philippine main archipelago, and are believed to be both economically valuable and strategically important for purposes of national security. The KIG was formally incorporated as a municipality of Palawan province in 1978 ...  Nine (9) of its islands and reefs presently host Philippine civilians and troops.”   These islands have Philippine names:  Lawak (internationally, Nanshan Island), Kota (Loaita), Likas (West York), Pag-asa (Thitu), Parola (Lankiam Cay), Panata (Northeast Cay), Patag (Flat), Rizal Reef (Commodore Reef) and Ayungin Shoal (Second Thomas Shoal).

The KIG is a 5th class municipality of Palawan with an area of 85 hectares and Pag-asa Island is the sole barangay. It is populated, and it has a sangguniang bayan.

There are other country claimants in the Spratlys as well as in the KIG.  As of 2013, the Primer lists Vietnam as having occupied 22 maritime features; China, 7; Malaysia, 5; and Taiwan, 1.

Being from Zambales, Bajo de Masinloc (Scarborough Shoal) is important to us because this is the rightful source of livelihood of our fishing villages. They have been deprived of their rights when China occupied this group of rocks.  

“Bajo de Masinlocs is an integral part of Philippine territory,” the Primer asserts, “being part of the Municipality of Masinloc, Province of Zambales. It is located 124 nautical miles west of Zambales proper and is within the 200 nautical-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and the Philippine Continental Shelf.”

We have also gone to the exhibit “Common Ground” at the Lopez Museum and Library to appreciate their collection of 21 antiquarian maps drawn by Western cartographers. These consistently included the Scarborough Shoal.  The exhibit reflects the lecture of SC Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio on the “Historical Facts, Historical Lies, and Historical Rights in the West Philippine Sea” where he strongly argued against China’s claims on the West Philippine Sea, which include Scarborough Shoal and Spratly Islands. 

The cartographic exhibit highlights that “for almost a millennium, the southernmost territory of China has always been Hainan Island. Scarborough Shoal never appeared in any Chinese dynasty maps. On the other hand, numerous ancient maps made by foreigners, and later by Philippine authorities, from 1636 to 1940, consistently showed that Scarborough Shoal, a.k.a. Panacot and Bajo de Masinloc, has always been part of Philippine history.” 

The presentation of Justice Carpio on “The Rule of Law in the West Philippine Sea” is a very helpful in understanding the case filed by the Philippines against China with the Arbitration Tribunal.  The four West Philippine Sea Arbitration Updates (May 2013, April, June and September 2014) of the Department of Foreign Affairs, and the paper “Arbitration 101: Philippines V. China” (January 2015) of UP College of Law Professor and IMLOS Director Jay L. Batongbacal track the progress of the case. All of these references are available online.

The first DFA Update described the filing of the case: “On 22 January 2013, the Philippines formally conveyed to China the Philippine Notification and Statement of Claim that challenges before the Arbitral Tribunal the validity of China’s nine-dash line claim to almost the entire SCS including the WPS and to desist from unlawful activities that violate the sovereign rights and jurisdiction of the Philippines under the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

“This notification initiated the arbitral proceeding under Article 287 and Annex VII of UNCLOS. The Philippines has exhausted almost all political and diplomatic avenues for a peaceful negotiated settlement of its maritime dispute with China.

“China’s nine-dash line claim is contrary to UNCLOS and unlawful. The Philippines is requesting the Tribunal to, among others, (a) declare that China’s rights to maritime areas in the South China Sea, like the rights of the Philippines, are established by UNCLOS, and consist of its rights to a Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone under Part II of UNCLOS, to an EEZ under part V, and to a Continental Shelf under Part VI; (b) declare that China’s maritime claims in the SCS based on its so-called nine-dash line are contrary to UNCLOS and invalid ; (c) require China to bring its domestic legislation into conformity with its obligations under UNCLOS; and (d) require China to desist from activities that violate the rights of the Philippines in its maritime domain in the WPS.”

The subsequent DFA Updates reported on the progress of the case. In Justice Carpio’s brief summary:  “China has refused to participate; four of 5 arbitrators appointed by President of ITLOS [the first one was nominated by the Philippines]; the Rules of Procedures issued; Philippines filed Memorial by 30 March 2014 deadline – 4000 pages; China given deadline of 15 December 2014 to submit counter-memorial.”  

In his Arbitration 101, Batongbacal wrote of the status of the proceedings as of January 2015.  He mentioned that “China publicly released a position paper [on 07 December 2014] outlining its objections to the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal while reiterating that it was not participating in the proceedings.”  He also said that the Tribunal issued its third Procedural Order on 17 December 2015, and gave the Philippines until 15 March 2015 to “submit a supplemental submission on the Tribunal’s jurisdiction and the merits of the case, in particular to address the points raised by China’s position paper. After the submission, China will have a similar period of 90 days within which to file a response.”

Could there be decision within this year?